There’s an eye-opening article in the current New York Review of Books that clarifies the complex role Pakistan plays in the Afghanistan conflict, underscored by last week’s killing of Osama bin Laden by U. S. special forces. As President Obama recently remarked in a 60 Minutes interview, “We think that there had to be some sort of support network for bin Laden inside of Pakistan.”
At the heart of Pakistan’s double-dealing lies the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), some of whom desire a post-war Afghanistan unfriendly to Indian interests. In fact, there exist elements of the Taliban who desire direct talks with the United States, only to have been thwarted by the ISI. Elizabeth Rubin, the author of the article, tells of meeting a Taliban higher-up in 2006 who tried to broker a deal with the Afghan government, only to be arrested by the ISI who conditioned his release on his returning to fighting against Afghan and Western forces.
We now know that the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul was perpetrated by the ISI. We know, too, that the Army is also involved in this duplicity, supporting anti-India policies. The two couriers who died along side of bin Laden, were nephews of a retired brigadier general, who financed the construction of the compound built within two miles of Pakistan’s elite military academy. Though this doesn’t establish complicity, it highlights the considerable linkage between the army and jihardist interests.
Rubin tellingly reflects at article end, “Will the revelation that bin Laden and family were dwelling in a newly built Pakistani Army mansion not far from the capital finally change the nature of the strange dance between the US and Pakistan? One wonders how good and smart men and women are taken in by diplomatic friendships, how they allow themselves to believe lies they know to be lies, or worse, settle for the lie because it seems there’s no way out, no creative solution to change the trusted old forms of diplomacy or the definitions of enemy and ally.”
The problem of Pakistan, however, isn’t as simple as Rubin makes it appear. Pakistan, for one thing, is a nuclear state. Additionally, Pakistan has, in any fair reckoning, provided invaluable assistance to our efforts in Afghanistan and as most people know, though they may publicly decry our drone strikes, they permit their continuance in a delicate balancing act in a nation increasingly Islamicized and with a chronic legacy of assassinating its leaders. Moreover, the Pakistanis have sustained many casualties from the very elements whom they have granted sanctuary.
What Pakistan must do is to clarify its interests and adopt a consistent, open policy, whether we like it or not. And if it does decide its interests lie with us, it needs to begin with cleaning-up the ISI.
As for ourselves, we need to cease our rhetorical dalliance and admit to our troubled relationship. It’s not, however, in our interest to “punish” Pakistan by resorting to measures such as cutting off aid. To do so would be knee-caping ourselves. We must persuade them that our interests are their interests as well.
Ironically, the killing of al Qaeda’s foremost terrorist mastermind may now give us an option to declare victory in Afghanistan, having achieved our objectives for the incursion in the first place: the expulsion of al Qaeda from its precincts and the bringing to justice of 9/11’s perpetrator.
At the heart of Pakistan’s double-dealing lies the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), some of whom desire a post-war Afghanistan unfriendly to Indian interests. In fact, there exist elements of the Taliban who desire direct talks with the United States, only to have been thwarted by the ISI. Elizabeth Rubin, the author of the article, tells of meeting a Taliban higher-up in 2006 who tried to broker a deal with the Afghan government, only to be arrested by the ISI who conditioned his release on his returning to fighting against Afghan and Western forces.
We now know that the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul was perpetrated by the ISI. We know, too, that the Army is also involved in this duplicity, supporting anti-India policies. The two couriers who died along side of bin Laden, were nephews of a retired brigadier general, who financed the construction of the compound built within two miles of Pakistan’s elite military academy. Though this doesn’t establish complicity, it highlights the considerable linkage between the army and jihardist interests.
Rubin tellingly reflects at article end, “Will the revelation that bin Laden and family were dwelling in a newly built Pakistani Army mansion not far from the capital finally change the nature of the strange dance between the US and Pakistan? One wonders how good and smart men and women are taken in by diplomatic friendships, how they allow themselves to believe lies they know to be lies, or worse, settle for the lie because it seems there’s no way out, no creative solution to change the trusted old forms of diplomacy or the definitions of enemy and ally.”
The problem of Pakistan, however, isn’t as simple as Rubin makes it appear. Pakistan, for one thing, is a nuclear state. Additionally, Pakistan has, in any fair reckoning, provided invaluable assistance to our efforts in Afghanistan and as most people know, though they may publicly decry our drone strikes, they permit their continuance in a delicate balancing act in a nation increasingly Islamicized and with a chronic legacy of assassinating its leaders. Moreover, the Pakistanis have sustained many casualties from the very elements whom they have granted sanctuary.
What Pakistan must do is to clarify its interests and adopt a consistent, open policy, whether we like it or not. And if it does decide its interests lie with us, it needs to begin with cleaning-up the ISI.
As for ourselves, we need to cease our rhetorical dalliance and admit to our troubled relationship. It’s not, however, in our interest to “punish” Pakistan by resorting to measures such as cutting off aid. To do so would be knee-caping ourselves. We must persuade them that our interests are their interests as well.
Ironically, the killing of al Qaeda’s foremost terrorist mastermind may now give us an option to declare victory in Afghanistan, having achieved our objectives for the incursion in the first place: the expulsion of al Qaeda from its precincts and the bringing to justice of 9/11’s perpetrator.
